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A Mental Patient's
Right to Vote
An analysis of the Wild case
by L Gostin BA JD, Legal Officer of
MIND, the National Association for
Mental Health
Since 1948 there has been universal suffrage in the
United Kingdom for persons of age, except for certain
specific groups such as peers, the Monarchy, and
persons in legal custody. In order to vote, the person's
name must appear on the register of electors as a
resident of a particular locality. Any place where the
elector legitimately resides (even a hostel, a general
hospital or a university) may be used as an address
which qualifies a person for entry onto the register.
The one exception is found in section 4(3) of the
Representation of the People Act 1949, as amended
by the Mental Health Act, 1959, which prevents a
patient from using a psychiatric hospital as his place
of residence for electoral purposes. Section 4(3) states:-
"A person who is a patient in any establishment
maintained wholly or mainly for the reception
and treatment of persons sufering from mental
illness (or other form of mental disorder), or
who is detained in legal custody at any place,
shall not, by reason thereof, be treated for the
purposes aforesaid as resident there."
It follows, therefore, that patients in a psychiatric
hospital or mental nursing home can only register as
voters if they have homes outside the hospital. An
informal (voluntary) patient who has no home is
disenfranchised because a psychiatric hospital,
according to the law, is not a home. Approximately
50,000 informal patients in hospitals for the mentally
ill and handicapped have no right to vote for this
reason alone. A person suffering from some form of
mental disorder is not disqualified from voting on
residential grounds alone. It appears from the
Burgess caseI that the name of an 'idiot' (now termed a
severely subnormal person) should not be allowed to
appear on the electoral register. However, a 'lunatic'
(now termed a person suffering from mental illness or
some minor form of mental disorder) may vote during
his lucid intervals. 'The returning officer is entitled to
take the vote of a person who is registered and who is
sufficiently compos mentis to discriminate between the
candidates and answer the statutory question-"Are
you the person whose name appears in the Register of
Electors?"
Anomalies Caused by the Residential Criterion
The fundamental objection to section 4(3) is that it
deprives a citizen of the right to vote, not on the basis of
individual fitness, but solely on a residential criterion.
An informal patient who has a home address can be
registered and can either visit a polling station or be
treated as an absentee voter. An equally capable
patient from the same hospital will be deprived of
the vote simply because he has no alternative address.
In effect, the system disenfranchises many people who
are homeless and confined to psychiatric hospitals
simply because our community services are inadequate.
The Government White Paper "Better Services for the
Mentally Handicapped"2 estimated that between one-
third and one-half of mentally handicapped adults in
hospital could be relocated in the community if
appropriate accommodation were available. " It is
more difficult to give a comparable estimate for
residents in mental illness hospitals but the recent
White Paper "Better Services for the Mentally 11' 4 does
identify some of the deficiencies in the provision of
services: 31 local authorities provide no residential
accommodation; 63 local authorities provide no day
care facilities; four and a half thousand community
beds are available against the thirty thousand needed.
Surveys conducted by MIND' suggest that between
one and two-thirds of the mental illness hospital
population do not require hospital treatment. Given
these estimates, the government suggests that there are
approximately 50,000 voluntary patients in psychiatric
hospitals in England and Wales who could be
disenfranchised because of their homelessness. 6 As
Mr. John Evans, MP said in a letter to W. H. Lawton,
the Electoral Registration Officer for Warrington,
Lancs., 8 February 1976:-
'These people are domiciled in hospital only
because they have no other place to go and our
enlightened civilisation has not yet got round to
providing enough purpose built small residential
units within the community to which they
could be discharged and so resume normal lives.
If anyone is to be condemned, it is a society
which does not care enough."
Closer scrutiny ofsection 4(3) reveals further anomalies.
Homeless patients in general or geriatric hospitals
are entitled to use the hospital as their place of
residence for voting purposes. Accordingly, a patient
in a psychiatric unit of a district general hospital is
entitled to vote whereas a resident in a psychiatric
hospital, possibly suffering from the same condition,
is not.
'Heyw. Co. El. 260
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The second Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform
recognised this anomaly in section 4(3). The Speaker,
Selwyn Lloyd, made this recommendation to the
Prime Minister on 21 October 1973:-
"Section 4(3) of the Representation of the
People Act 1949 creates an anomaly in that all
patients in general hospitals, including
mental cases, can be so registered. This
subsection should be amended to place patients
in mental hospitals on the same footing as
those in general hospitals.
An interdepartmental working party should be
set up by the DHSS and the Home Departments
to consider in conjunction with representatives
of the political parties and local authority
officials, the arrangements which need to be
made in order to implement the above decision
and to make recommendations."
This recommendation was supported by such
organisations as MIND, the Royal College of
Psychiatrists, and the Scottish Mental Welfare
Commission. The interdepartmental working party
was duly established. In June 1974, the Home
Office Minister, Dr. Summerskill, said that the
working party "hopes to report early next year". On
15 May, 1975, she promised that the working party
would report later that year. On 24 February 1976,
Mr. John Evans, MP, tabled a parliamentary
question, again asking when the working party is
likely to report. Dr. Owen of the DHSS replied that the
"recommendation of the Speaker's Conference raises
a number of complex issues which the Conference
may not have appreciated . . . (We are) considering
whether this issue should be referred to a reconvened
Speaker's Conference on Electoral Law".
MIND placed a good deal of pressure on the
government as a result of this statement. A paper was
prepared which was submitted to the DHSS and
Home Office on the issue. 7 The paper made known
MIND's intention to pursue the case of Wild and
Others v Electoral Registration Officer for Warrington.
On 2o May 1976, Mr. John of the Home Office
announced in Parliament that the Government had
accepted, in principle, the recommendation of the
Speaker's Conference to repeal section 4(3).
However, this statement of principle was made
"subject to the satisfactory resolution of certain
practical problems". (The precise nature of these
problems were not disclosed.)
On 15June 1976 the case of Wild was heard and
decided by Judge Lloyd Jones of the County Court,
Warrington.
The Case of Wild and Others v Electoral
Registration Officer for Warrington
Winwick Hospital, Warrington, is an "establishment
maintained wholly or mainly for the reception and
treatment of persons suffering from mental illness (or
other form of mental disorder)". The hospital, after a
systematic review of its 1,7oo residents, notified the
local electoral registration officer of the names of 574
people who in their opinion were fit to vote on the
qualifying date (io October 1975). The electoral officer
duly included their names in the provisional register
of local voters.
An objection to their inclusion was taken by the
Newton Constituency Conservative Association on the
grounds that section 4(3) of the Representation of the
People Act 1949 appeared to prevent any of them
from using Winwick Hospital as a residence for
electoral purposes; none of these people had a place
of residence other than the hospital. The electoral
officer accepted the objection as valid and deleted
the names of the 574 people. Five of the 574
availed themselves of the right to be heard by the
electoral officer in an attempt to secure a reversal of his
decision to delete their names from the register.
The electoral officer, having heard the evidence, held
that the five people .with which he was concerned
were 'patients' within the meaning of section 4(3) of
the Representation of the People Act 1949, and were
therefore not entitled to use the hospital as a place of
residence for voting purposes.
The five people appealed to the County Court,
Warrington, under the provisions of section 45 of the
1949 Act and Regulation 66 of the Representation of
the People Regulations 1974. Two of the appellants
withdrew: one because he was a compulsory patient
under sections 6o and 65 of the Mental Health Act 1959
and was therefore barred from voting as a person who
was under 'legal custody'; the other because she had
been discharged from the hospital and was successfully
caring for a 99 year old woman. The case was heard by
Judge Lloyd Jones on 15 June 1976.
The evidence given by a consultant psychiatrist at
Winwick Hospital established that at the qualifying
date:-
i) The appellants were not suffering or appearing
to be suffering from mental disorder.
2) If the appellants were to present themselves to
the hospital, they would not have been admitted.
3) There was no medical reason for the appellants
to remain in hospital; they did so simply because
there was no accommodation available in the
community.
4) The appellants were taking medication in the
form of tranquilisers for minor depressive
conditions or barbiturates for insomnia. The issue
was raised whether the receipt of such treatment
necessarily implied that it was treatment for a
mental disorder. The doctor suggested that he
was not, in fact, treating them for that. He was
giving them medication, certainly, but it was to
patients who had been virtually, if not completely,
cured, and who were being medicated in order to
prevent any recurrence of any mental disorder or
illness. He made it clear that this was the type of
medication that was frequently prescribed by
general practitioners in the community. The
treatment could be regarded as for a nervous
condition which did not amount to a mental
disorder within the meaning of the 1949 Act, as
amended by the Mental Health Act 1959.
5) The appellants were living in the rehabilitation
unit of the hospital. They slept in typical hospital
wards and spent their leisure hours in day rooms.
However, they were allowed to come and go as
they pleased and were not subject to most of the
rules which applied in the rest of the hospital.
The paper which was submitted to the
Home Office and DHSS has now been
published; see L Gostin " The Right to
Votefor Mental Patients", Community
Care 26 May 1976, p 12
They were imminently due to be transferred to
the 'half-way house' as soon as it was completed.
It is noteworthy that less than one week after the
qualifying date the appellants were transferred to the
newly built half-way house. The house had once been
the home of the doctor in charge. He lived there with
his family, and it was during this time that the
address was first placed on the electoral register.
Judge Lloyd Jones described the house thus:-
"The half-u'ay house in W inwick is, or consists
rather, of two houses known as Hollins House,
to which those one-time patients who are
sufficiently recovered to take their places in
the community are sent. There is room for
twenty people in the two houses, they go there
preparatory to being released or discharged
from hospital. They are paid money, they
come and go as they please. There are virtually
no restrictions upon them and they
themselves see to any medication which is
prescribed for them."
The evidence of the consultant psychiatrist in the
County Court established that the half-way house of
the hospital was indistinguishable from an
unsupervised hostel in the community. Residents of a
community hostel may use it as a place of residence for
electoral purposes; the issue here, however, was that
the half-way house was within the curtilage of
Winwick Hospital.
The Definit:ion of a 'Patient'
The words of section 4(3) raise several questions. First,
is Winwick an establishment maintained wholly or
mainly for the reception and treatment of persons
suffering from mental illness or other form of mental
disorder? This issue was not contested in the County
Court. Neither was it contested that the appellants were
resident in that establishment; they lived at the
hospital, and but for section 4(3), they could have
used that address as a place of residence for electoral
purposes. The crucial question was whether they were
"patients" in that establishment.
Beforethe Wildcase, there had been no judgment by an
English court in respect ofsection 4(3), but the issue did
arise in the Sheriff's Court in Dumfries, Scotand-
A and B Dumfries and Galloway Electoral Registration
Officer". Although in that case the Sheriff found that
the terms of section 4(3) prevented two residents of the
Crichton Royal Institution from securing the entry of
their names upon the electoral register, it was plain
from the judgment that their status as 'patients' had
not been argued:-
"It was not contended that the description
'patient' was inapplicable to Mr. A, although he
appeared to be quite well. Neither did Dr.
Owens contend that Miss B, whom I did not see,
was a patient. In these circumstances, it appears
to me that both Mr. A and Miss B satisfy the
description in section 4(3)-'a person who is
a patient'. They are not on the staf at the
Crchton Royal Institution and persons
resident at the Crichion Royal Institution
must belong to one of two categories-patients
or staff",
The judgment of a Scottish Sheriff's court is not, of
course, binding upon any English court in any event.
The following constitutional principle must be the
starting point in any attempt to construe the word
"patient" in section 4(3):9
"Unless a clear and unambiguous intention so
to do appears from a statute it should not be
construed so as to invade the liberty of a subject
(a) so as to confer(b) or take away (c) rights
to vote or similar constitutional rights."
The 1949 Act did not define the term "patient". The
term must therefore be defined in accordance with its
ordinary and normal meaning.
The word "patient" stems from the Latin "pati"
which means to suffer or be injured. It is defined in
the Oxford English Dictionary (p. 555) as follows:
(i) "a sufferer; one who suffers patiently"; (2) "one
who is under medical treatment for the cure of some
disease or wound; one of the sick persons whom a
medical man attends; an in-mate of an infirmary or
hospital"; (3) "a person subjected to the supervision,
care, treatment, or the correction of someone"; (4) "a
person or thing that undergoes some action, or to whom
or which something is done; that which receives
impressions from external agents."
The Latin derivative and the interpretation of patient
given in the Oxford English Dictionary suggests that
the term "patient" refers to a condition and not a status.
The definitions suggest that a patient is a person who
suffers from an illness, and is receiving medical
treatment in an attempt to alleviate that suffering.
In one sense, any person who is registered with a
doctor is a patient. A substantial proportion of the
ordinary community receive the same medicine for
mild depression or insomnia (not being mental
disorders as defined by the Mental Health Act 1959
which amended section 4(3) of the 1949 Act) as the
appellants in the Wild case. But the term "patient"
must be read within the complete context given in
section 4(3): "a patient in any establishment.., for the
reception and treatment of persons suffering from
mental illness (or other form of mental disorder)".
Thus, the person must be a patient who is suffering
from a specific condition, i.e. mental disorder. Any
treatment which the person receives must be referable
to the primary purpose of the institution.
The doctor who once resided in what is now the half-
way house at Winwick Hospital may have suffered
from a medical illness and may even have received
treatment for that illness within the confines of the
hospital. He would thus be a "patient" in the general
sense, but would not thereby be a "patient" within
the meaning of section 4(3). The mere fact that he was
residing in the institution, and was receiving treatment
for an illness not amounting to a mental disorder,
does not identify him as a patient of that institution.
The definition of "patient" given in the Mental Health
Act 1959 lends support to the proposition that the term
refers to a condition and not a status. Section 147 of the
Act defines "patient" (except in Part VIII of the 1959
Act) as "a person suffering or appearing to be suffering
from mental disorder". Mental disorder is defined in
section 4 of the 1959 Act as mental illness, severe
subnormality, subnormality or psychopathic disorder.
Subnormality and severe subnormality means a state
of arrested or incomplete development of the mind;
psychopathic disorder means a persistent disorder or
81963 S. L. T. Sh. Ct. Reports p 25
9Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd
Edition, vol. 36, p 412
19
disability of mind which results in abnormally
aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct; mental
illness is left undefined.
The general principle that subsequent statutes should
not be relied upon as aids in construction of earlier
statutes appears to prevent the use of the 1959 Act as an
aid in construing the 1949 Act. However, the principle
is not an absolute one, and in this case, there are good
grounds for suggesting that the later Act could shed
useful light upon the meaning of the earlier Act. Maxwell
on Interpretation of Statutes, i 1th edition, p. 34-
"Earlier Act Explained by Later" states: "Not only
may the later Act be construed by the light of the
earlier, but it sometimes furnishes a legislative
interpretation of the earlier, if it is in pari materia and if
(but only if) the provisions of the earlier Act are
ambiguous". It is noteworthy that Part II of the
Seventh Schedule of the 1959 Act amended section 4(3)
of the 1949 Act by removing the words "or mental
defectiveness", substituting "or other mental
disorders". Thus, the 1959 Act amends subsection 4(3)
with words which are used in the definition of patient.
There is an earlier Act which gives a descriptional
interpretation of the word "patient". Section 79 of the
National Health Service Act 1946 states: "Patient
includes an expectant mother and a lying-in woman".
These people are not suffering from an illness or
abnormality, and would not under one view be
considered "patients". Section 79 extended the term
patient to include these people who are in hospital or
being provided with the National Health Service for a
perfectly natural phenomenon, namely that of child-
birth, as distinct from a pathological condition
requiring medical intervention. Thus, Parliament
apparently had a narrow concept of the term
"patient" (i.e. a sufferer) and had to extend that
definition for the purposes of the 1946 Act.
Section i of the Poor Removal Act 1846 provided that
time during which a person was "a patient in a
hospital" should be excluded from the computation
of the period which rendered a pauper irremovable
from a parish. There were cases under this section in
which there was reference to the possibility of a
patient beingin a hospital not necessarily as a patient: ' 0
"The word 'patient' seems to me to involve that
the primay purpose of the inmate in the alleged
hospital should be either medical or surgical
treatment . . ." (from the judgment of Greer J.
in Tendering Union v Woolwich Union,
1923 1 K.B. atp. 126).
"Then it was said that taking the facts of this
case, the proper conclusion was that Coxon
was not in this institution as a patient to be
treated for the disease of epilepsy, but that being
an epileptic person, he found this institution a
convenient place of residence. I think that on the
facts of this special case, it is impossible to come
to that conclusion; it appears that he remained
there as a patient continuously receiving care
and treatmentfrom the date of his admission
until Januagy 1902". (Ormskirk Union v
Chorlton Union 1903 2 K.B. per Vaughan
Williams L.J. at (p. 502) ).
"No one in ordinary language would talk of a
patient in a hospital as residing at the hospital.
No one would describe that as his residence. The
ordinary patient in a hospital may go there with
the intention and hope of coming out as soon as he
he is cured. This pauper, in my opinion, was
residing at this home. She was not there merely
for the purpose temporarily of being cured of any
ailment, but went there intending to stay, assuming
the facts are correct, that she was sixteen years
of age or upwards, and that she went till she
should be trained and find a situation. That is
the main and principal purpose for which this
institution exists. That being its main purpose,
I do not think it can properly be described as a
'hospital' and I do not think this pauper could
properly be described as a patient residing there.
For these reasons I agree the answer should be
that she was irremovable". (Ormskirk Union
v Lancaster Union 107 L. T. at (p. 623)
per Avory J7.).
The Decision of the County Court
Judge LloydJones found that the three appellants were
not at the material time suffering from a mental
disorder and were not therefore "patients" within the
meaning of section 4(3). Accordingly, he ordered that
the three names be restored to the electoral register.
He rested his decision on the definition contained in
section 147 of the Mental Health Act 1959, which he
found could be properly used, even though it was a
subsequent statute.
The narrow construction of section 4(3) was in part
based upon the principle that the "right to vote at an
election is an important right which is the important
constitutional right of all .persons of full age and
understanding who are not in any way disqualified..."
In dicta Judge Lloyd Jones recognised that there is a
substantial proportion (estimated by the government
as one-third) of the patients in psychiatric hospitals
who are continuing to reside there long after there
exists a medical reason for doing so. These people have
been subject to deprivation of certain rights of
citizenship (for example-unimpeded access to the
courts and freedom of expression) although they are
capable of exercising those rights. In respect of the right
to vote, the learned judge said:-
"The evidence in this case shows yet again the
tragic situation which is arising and has arisen
for some years with our mental hospitals and
those who work so assiduously in them have
succeeded in bringing about cures in sometimes
difficult anxious cases and where they have
declared the persons concerned to be free of any
hospital regime and fit to take their place in
society, it illustrates again the tragedy of people
in that situation who have just nowhere to go from
hospital. That is a problem which has been with
us for very many years and it would seem to me
that if the decision of the Electoral Registration
Officer is right, it would seem that people who
have gone into hospital with a mental disorder
or illness who are cured and still remain cured
for a number ofyears and are unfortunate enough
not to find anywhere to live outside the hospital,
1 0 Quotations taken from advice by Olive,
Thorold concerning the case of Wild and
Others v Electoral.Registration
Officer for Warrington (15 .Tue
1976). The author wishes to express
his gratitude to Mr Thorold.
I 'Parliamentary Answer by AfrEnnals MP, Hansard 29 June 1976,
p. 188; Parliamentary Answer by
Mr John MP, Hansard 24 June
1976, pp 587 589
will never be able to exercise their right to vote
at an election."
Following the Warrington decision, the Home Office
and DHSS confirmed that there were in the order of
50,000 people in psychiatric hospitals who have the
legal capacity to vote but who have been
disenfranchised by the operation of section 4(3). The
working party set up to make recommendations
concerning the repeal of section 4(3) are now taking
the views of political parties and other interested bodies
on the practical difficulties in implementing the
recommendation of the second Speaker's Conference
on Electoral Reform. Mr. Ennals of the DHSS
concluded by saying: "I hope that this will not take
too long and that the working party will be able to
complete its report later in the year." 1
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